Abstract: This article explores the extent to which our deliberative culturedetermines our capacity to recognize relevant knowledge,tos electa nd value epistemic authority,ortorecognize the importance of individual and/or collective epistemic achievementsi nadeliberative context.T his investigation is especially relevant in am oment in which the formationo fp ublic opinion no longer depends exclusively on political parties. Thisl eads to ap aradoxical situation in which the diffuse energy issued by the electorate is not easilys ubjected to the discipline of party-oriented proposals or by media disputes that, despite their projection, mayb ei gnored by many people. Thus, it is unclear in which sense social networks act as an alternativet ot he traditionals ystem of intermediation set up by trade unions and pressuregroups.Bycombiningthe approaches of deliberatived emocracy and social cognition theories, this essays ustains the relevanceofwhat is defined here as 'cooperative cognition' in order to face this challenge.
Introduction
The thematic field of politics (or,atleast,its perception) has grown considerably in recent years, and this trend is not expected to decline.This socio-political phenomenon poses ac hallenget op ublic institutions at different levels of government (i. e. local, national and supranational or global). In the public space, perception vis-a-vis institutions' legitimacydepends on the value deriving from their effective capacity for mediation (Innerarity 2006) . When the thematic field of politics is enlargedand,atthe same time, vehiculated in an accelerated manner,the following phenomena occur: (i) difficulty in channelling not onlya ll the informationb ut,a bovea ll, the demand for it; (ii) difficulty in determiningw ho are the agents responsible for taking decisions; and (iii) increasingcomplexity in actual levels of government and, consequently, of decision-taking.T ot hese, we maya dd another,n ol essi mportant phenomenon: namely, greater opportunity and motivation to participate in public life. There is ac ausal explanation for this increase experiencedbynumerous collectives, both in opportunity and motivation to participate, which can be found in the theoretical framework of the research conducted by Putnam (1993) on civic traditions in modern Italy. The concept of 'social capital' is generallya ccepted as an explanatory factor of the potential for developmentinasociety and in anation. Furthermore, society perceivesthe experience of participation as an instrumentfor orienting the benefits (symbolic or otherwise) deriving from the existencea nd operation of networks, bonds of confidence, and underlying social norms.
Despite the absenceo fatheory on risk of participation, the theoretical framework referred to abovea llows us to establish that the feasibilityo faparticipative experience goes-necessarily-hand in hand with as ituation of inequality: inequality of access to information, and inequality in the sharing of capabilities for processing not onlys uch information, but also the diagnoses that stem from it; inequality in the personal,collective and group resources acquired duringthe associative and participative action itself; inequality that,essentially, likewise affects representability in political themes, as well as the theoretical articulation of demands and even the social profile of the groups expressingdiagnoses and demands. Unequal representation derives from the fact that, in every participatory experience,p eople and groups appoint themselvesa sa gents for collective actions. Because of this,t he social function that can rightfullyb ea ttributed to participation (understood as an instrument for increasing the social capital of collectives) ultimatelycauses friction with the principle of representativeness. Even in cases wherethis can be understood as an expression of the collective need to increase the social capital, mere participation failst og uarantee public representativeness of political diagnoses or their frameworks.
'Frame alignment' is an example of am eans to detect the existenceo fp articipative bias and to demonstrate the difficulty involved in identifying and building authoritative voices in the public space. Some political scientists (Snow et al. 1986 ) use the expression 'frame alignment' to refer to the socio-political phenomenon by means of which social movementsd evelop as eries of complex mechanisms that allow ap rogressive number of followers to adopt the aims of an organized collective or,inmoregeneral terms, of an organisation. Frame alignment exemplifies how,asthey unfold within asociety,participation processes give rise to hybrid new forms of participation, to solve legitimacy problems that derive from the challengeo fr epresentativeness. Today, professionals, groups and sectors from ab road rangeo fs ociety types form part of af rame alignment phenomenon whose immediate political action is herein linked to the enlargement of the thematicfield of politics.This transnationalpolitical phenomenon drawso ur attention to the need to analyse and propose cooperative rationality models to solve the normative and practical problems of modern societies. In my defence of acooperative cognition model and its rationality,Iwill focus on the following questions: (1) what kind of leadership is compatible with the mentioned proposal; (2)w hat does social cognition means and whyd oes it matter;a nd (3) in what sense is deliberation as pecific kind of cooperative cognition?
Types of leadership
Analysts of deliberative behavior,a iming to measure and automated eliberative communication in order to programme and design platforms adapted to these communicative ends, usually establish threel evels in defining deliberation. The first is the macro-level, in which deliberation is linked to deliberative democracy,atype of democracy in which collective decision-making is based to alarge extent on aconsensus-oriented discourse and on argumentative discourse rather than on the rule of majority.A tt he second or meso-level, we find specific types of deliberative forum (e. g. public addresses,r ound tables,citizens' conferences or consensus conferences). Deliberativef orums of this nature are created to make ad ecision on the adoption of ac ollective norm or the resolution of a local conflict. The third or micro-level describes af orm of political communication that,for instance, is opposed to the various modes of rhetoric and strategic communication, and is present at parliamentary forums, political speeches and, to some extent,atcertain moments duringpolitical negotiation processes. These three levels can be distinguished thanks to the assumption of (i) regulatory attributes of the institutional environment,( ii) interpersonal communications and (iii) the presenceo fi ndividual deliberative behavior.
Deliberation is not onlyaform of political communication, but alsot he expression of ar egulated form of communication on issues of public interest,i mplying aform of epistemic organization of the spaces for intermediation between civil society and the governmental structures generallyidentified with the State. If deliberative democracy can be understood as as pecific model of democracy, then we must consider thatcertain initial epistemic assumptions exert an influence on the environment of deliberation. What are these presuppositions and what are the grounds for their legitimacy?W hy is deliberatived emocracy a form of epistemic organization of socio-political environments?D eliberation is ap olitical communication model open to analysis from an epistemic point of view because it is as pace for the organization of subjects of knowledge,i n which to examine trulye pistemic aspects (e. g. epistemic virtuesp ertaining to the environment,epistemic values that strengthen and regulate this communicative practice, or epistemic and heuristicb iases that, in certain spheres,m ay weaken the epistemic values and virtueso fd eliberation).
An imaget hat conveys this position is found in the distinction commonly made in political science between three types of leadership: foundational leadership, moralleadership and creative leadership (Barber 1984 (Barber ,1988 . This image mayseem somewhat paradoxical-after all, the capacity for leadership is usually attributed firstly to individuals,a nd, on counted occasions,t og roups and human collectives.
The deliberative model exerts creative leadership in thati ta pplies the principle of encouraging and reinforcing the will, the skills and the deliberative behavior of citizens in order to prevent them from seeing themselvesasmere spectators of the capabilities displayedb yt hosei ng overning roles. Creative leadership in the deliberative democracy model is embodied by the set of epistemic rules, principles and values used to design the political game in which the players are engaged. To acertain extent,wecan saythatleadership, in this scenario, is not onlycreative but foundational, too. Nevertheless, it can alsobestated that it is creative,strictlyspeaking,given thatitfixes its quasi-therapeutic attention on the citizenry,e nhancing the latter'sc ivic commitment to the task of examining proposals,weighing the epistemic authority of proposers,opponents and proposals,a nd, finally, pondering the decisions to be taken.
In contrast to the foundational and creative leadership associated herein with the deliberatived emocracym odel, moral leadership describes the skills of those advocating as pecific awareness of the responsibility taken over any issue, but (seemingly)w ithout becomingi nvolvedi nt he mobilizations and claims of agiven proposal. Generallyspeaking, the people or collectivesexercising this type of leadership inspire and encouragemobilizationsbyimbuing citizens' social and political perception with amoralizing endeavor. Just as deliberative democracy is av ehicle for creative leadership, so is radical democracy for moral leadership. Fori nstance,i nt he proposal put forward by Chantal Mouffe (1993) , both the idea of rational consensus and the idea that there is as ubstantive good on which to found acommunity displaytraits of moral leadership. According to this model, the antagonistic character of the political is irreconcilable with the idea that pre-constitutive individual identities and collective identities maye xist.
In accordance with Mouffe'sm odel of radical democracy, the identification and presentation of preferences is exogenous, or stemmingfrom origins thatare external to deliberative practice. This is not the case in the deliberative model, which is grounded, precisely, in aprocess-namelydeliberation, oriented toward the identificationa nd readjustment of preferences in an endogenous manner, which means that adjustments and/or readjustments originatei nt he interior of the deliberative process. Mouffe uses the dyad 'friend/foe' (Schmitt 1932) to evoke the impossibility of eliminating the antagonismb etween 'we' and 'they' in construction processes of political identity.I nf act,h er proposal implies that 'affective dimensions' act as ad etonator for collective political identities. Individual, group and/or collective identification alike are constituted through the intervention of certain 'political rivalry emotions' stemmingf rom a( radical) sense of belongingt oa ntagonistic social and economic classes. One weakness that can be observed in Mouffe'sa pproach is that it does not consider the possible impact of the dynamism of beliefs, or the processes by which preferences are adjusted and calibrated, on her model of radical democracy.Her model provides information regardingthe causal relationship existing between the discovery of an agonic identity (e. g. thatofeach among one'sown and opposed to that of the others) and its mobilizingeffect.Hers is amodel thatdoes not accommodate spaces for the formation of preferences, but rather spaces for confrontation understood as vehicles of polarization and politicization, drivenb yt he perception that the dominantg roup, i. e. the elites,i si dentified with non-convergent antagonistic preferences.
Democracy is told in manyw ays, and although the radical or radicalized representative democracy model can be seen-as Ipropose herein-as aparadigmatic example of moral leadership, it nevertheless presents aclear deficit in creative leadership. We mayi ndeed ask, for instance, to what extent this model of radical democracy encourages ap olitical culturef avorable to the emergence of 'vigilant societies',a ne xpression thatdescribes the civil society of democracies such as thoseofDenmarkorNorway, in which people displayahigher degree of intolerance towardpolitical practices that deviate from their function. Nevertheless, one of Mouffe'smanymerits is that she allows us to establish arelationship between the antagonismw ith which each citizen experiences their individual and collective (political) identity,and their predisposition for protest,denouncement and social vigilance. Experiencing this antagonistic effect is dependenton individuals' opportunitytoidentifythe traits of their social and political identity when participatingi nc ollective vindication processes.
Opportunities and challenges in ad eliberative democracy
Bearing in mind the manyv ariables in the crisis currentlya ffecting democratic institutions, it would seem onlyf air to recognize the value of moral leadership in this definition of democracy.H owever,m oral leadership is not enough to build ap olitical culturet ied to ad eliberative democracy model. This model does not share the deliberative notion of the shapingf unctiono fp ersonal and institutional identity exercised by political culture. Such as cenario, in which radical and deliberative democracya re counterposed-subject to nuances, no doubt-mays ervet ol ead us to the epistemic dimensionso fad eliberative model of democracy.
Some of the factors involvedi nt he epistemic dimension of deliberation are not only factors but also the materials necessary to securet he epistemic organization of democracy.A ccordingt ot he cognitivist thesis shared by most theorists, deliberation causes (1) problems in the statutes of individual preferences and opinions, (2)rationalizes preferences and (3) filters them. "Every successful deliberation impacts on individual opinions and preferences,significantlytransforming them or providinga ni ncentive for their deeper justification, and this epistemic character contributes to the very legitimacy of democracy".
Researcho nt he epistemic dimension of democracy mayb er egarded as an extension of traditional epistemology. Generally, it can be stated that the objects of such research are the doxastic decision processes in the caseo fi nstitutional agents, processesand environments.F urthermore, it is initiallyassumed that,as pointed out by Broncano, the demos becomes something greater than a 'mass' when it recognizes itself as a 'distribution' of voices and capacities,a nd consequently, when it establishes ap rinciple accordingt ow hich citizens-on the strength of theirc itizenship-acknowledge each other'sa uthority (Broncano 2003 (Broncano ,2008 . Citizens' epistemic capacities are apportioned, but these capacities cannot be assessed independentlyofthe environments producedbythe (fallible) design of educational, political, economic or other institutions. It is thereforei n social epistemology that we find the best arguments to understand the relationship between epistemology and democracy.
The existenceo fe pistemic capacities,a nd of institutional environments associated with their configuration and confirmation, implies that these capacities present apublicdimension when deployed in deliberative processes. The capacities to (1) formulate questions genuinelya imed towards afeguardingo rr epresenting public interests, to (2)m ake proper use of culturalr esources,o rt o( 3) make use of cognitive skills in order to articulate and defend claims in apersuasive manner,are samples of the many aspects open to research from the point of view of social epistemology.
How should we define intersubjective correction criteria that are not based solelyo nt he (proper)u se of argumentative ways of thinking? How should we distinguish beliefs from personal preferences when engagedi nd eliberation? Are the phases in deliberation effective to ensure the correct adjustment for beliefs?D oes deliberation suffice to detect logical errors and to make use of intellectualvirtues?Inlight of these and other questions, manyauthors query whether this model does not imposeh eavy restrictions and demands, as it involves assuming as valid thati ts citizens possess sophisticated cognitivec apabilities and are endowed with the necessary skills and criteria to make advantageous use of them. It would be interesting to verify whether this is the case, by assuming at the outset ac ertain epistemic paternalism with an analytical perspective. However,itisalso reasonable to state that deliberativeinequity is related not to the absenceofacapability,but rather to the manner in which it is distributedthat is, with the institutional design that should guarantee the equilibrium between, on the one hand, the relationaldimension (i. e. the social and democratic dimension of deliberation) and the logical and dialectic dimension associated with the consistent use of practical reasoning and argumentative lines of thinking.F urthermore, deliberative inequity is alsorelated to the ignorance of reason shown in accessing the truth in beliefs; for instance, when giving justification for beliefs exclusivelyo nt he grounds of the reasons for holding thats omething is true, or to displays ufficient skills as argumentative agents when making use of practical reasoning.
Deliberative and epistemic inequities
One of the greatest difficulties consists in failing to detect deliberative inequities promoted by institutional designs that inhibitthe capacity to recognize the epistemic merits of proponents and opponents in ad eliberation. Murguía Lores (2014 Lores ( , 2016 recalls,f or example, the thesis of Smith and Semin (2007) , according to which human cognitive systems produce situated versions of concepts, because said versions have specific functions within each context.I ft his is the case, then to what extent will the influenceofour deliberative culture determine our capacity to recognize the relevant knowledge in adeliberative context,toselect and value epistemic authority,o rt or ecognize the importance of individual and/or collective epistemic achievements?
Bearing in mind the analyses performedbycertain political scientists (Fricker 2007;Byung-Chul Han 2014; Subirats /V allespín 2014; Ausín 2014), we can affirm that the crisis areas our political culture is crossingare relatedtoeminently epistemic spaces,functionsand dimensions of democracy.Itisfundamental that we acknowledge this fact,ifw eaccept the theoretical position in which the recognition of epistemic merits and achievements occurs in asituated manner-for example, within specific deliberativee nvironments threatened by crises of all kinds. We can distinguish at least threem ajor crisis areas:( A) the area comprising mediation mechanisms; (B) the communications area; and (C)t he area of representation. These affect the following: A) acrisis in the mechanisms for mediation between society and politics, which can be appreciatedinthe representation crises of political parties (whichappear to represent themselves); B) acrisis in the sphere of traditional communication that does not monopolize the traditional communication channels, but is shared by the new virtual community in the new debating scenarios (e. g. blogs, social networks); and C) the difficulty to articulate ap arty model that satisfies the functions all parties need to fulfill (i. e. relative aperture and closure to gain identity,a nd to act as astable, predictable political agent forming an institutional identity).
Socialc ognition
The term 'social cognition' is used in human and social sciencest or efer to theories, categories and principles that explain and interpret issues relatingt o human beings' knowledge of the social world. It alsorefers to acomplex of epistemic and neuropsychological processest hata re deployedb yh uman beings in the acquisition, processing and institutionalization of knowledge and information in social contexts. While we generallyu se 'cognition' to refert ol earning and processing information in an individual and autonomous manner,the social perspective of cognitioni sb ased on the assumption thatt he nature and evolution of the processes of reasoning,memorizing,perception, learning,judgment, etc. are configured collectively, i. e. through personal interaction, and as ac onsequence of our exposure to the problem of extractingmeaningfrom the behavior of otherh uman beings. The distinctionbetween individual and social cognition lies in the fact that, in the latter,prototypicallycollective processes intervene (e. g. interaction, communication, social reasoninga nd inference, social categorization, adoption of perspectivesa nd interpretations, causal attribution, and also the natural disposition of human beingst or elate to each othera nd communicate among themselvestheirhistory). The convergenceofall these factors renders social cognition an area of research in which such different disciplines as social psychology, evolutionary psychology, social epistemology,s ociologyo fi nstitutions, philosophy of the mind, evolutionary anthropology,s ocial ontology and neuropsychology necessarilyc oncur.
The field of research concernedwith the studyofsocial cognition has developed over the last 30 years (Higgins /Bargh 1987; Schneider 1991; Higgins 2000; Fiskeetal. 2007; Nichols 2004) . There is adegree of consensus regarding certain importantassumptions shared by specialists; for example, that accordingtoone such assumption, social cognition is presented as an activity thatallows people to understand other human beings and to interact successfully. We can sayt hat denial of this presupposition is onlyp artial, and onlye xpressed by thosew ho consider that social cognition,r ather than an activity or an action, constitutes am ethodological perspective whose aim is to studys ocial interaction (Ostrom 1994) .
If this is taken as amethodological orientation of social psychology, the aim is to measure and analyze situated social cognition, i. e. perceptions, judgments and memories. It is also worth noting that some authors consider thatt herei s consensus over the two questions central to the debate on social cognition (Fiske/Marcrae 2012) . The first of these is how to establish adistinction between social and non-social knowledge;t he second is whether therei sa ny aspect or element of cognition that can be presented as fundamental to the acquisition and configuration of social knowledge.W hen examining these questions, some authors consider that action is preciselyt he determiningf actor in the response to both questions, and that thereare two reasons for this:because action is aproperty that we assume as exclusive to social cognition agents, to the exclusion of non-social objects; and because action expresses the dynamismand reciprocity generated between the person and the social environment (Ostrom1984; Marsh /R ichardson /S chmidt 2009).
One of the distinctivefeatures of human cognition is the dynamic participation in collaborativea ctivitiest hat help the human race to develop as hared intentionality in pursuing objectivesi nacollective manner.T op articipate in this kind of collaborative activity,i ti sn ecessary (i) to gain the capacity to guess the intentions of othermembers of the species; (ii) to have sufficient prior motivation to share mental states;a nd (iii) to develop and recognize ways of representing cognition. As ar esult,o ne of the human race'sd istinguishing features is ar adicallyc ulturald imension of cognition, which is manifested through the creation and use of linguistic symbols and material artifacts, the construction and definition of social rules, and the establishment of social institutions (Tomasello et al. 2005; S earle 1995) .
Amajority of authors find that there is sufficient empirical evidence to affirm that the capacity to read others' intentions and sociocultural cognition go hand in hand. Forexample, both in the sphere of social psychologyand in psychology and evolutionary anthropology,mention is made of the use of linguistic symbols in infancy that the child must necessarilyunderstand, engagingwith other people as agents of their intention, as well as paying attention to entities that exist in the social world. However,a lthough social cognition specialists maintain the thesis that an inextricable relationship exists between humans' capacity for readingothers' minds and culturalcognition, it is currentlyassumed that understanding intentionality in othera gents can neither be presented as the sole fea-ture of culturalc ognition nor be considered enough to produce skills of cultural cognition. Instead, the research hypothesis thato nlyh uman beingsa re biologicallya dapted to participate in collaborative activities involving shared objectives, sociallyc oordinatedp lans of action ('we-intentionality')a nd dialogic forms of cognitive representation, seems more feasible (Tomasello et al. 2005, p. 676) .
The abovea rgument is linked to the idea that social phenomena cannot be reducedt ot he sum of the wills of individuals. The element of individual intentionality is not sufficient to explain phenomena such as the existence of rules and social conventions, or the social cognition hypothesis itself. Rather,the reverse seems to be true. We find that complex social structures allow human beingstoreason and act in collective scenarios.Insuch scenarios,intentionality is expressed and structured in ac ollective manner,a nd is closelyr elated to representations and interpretations of the world. Consequently, social cognition is not merelyasocial phenomenon, but is also related to the social expression of other phenomena.
Of these, one of the most outstanding has been namedbyJ ohn Searle 'institutional fact(s)'.Searle claims that social reality is made up not onlyofraw facts, i. e. facts constituted solelybyphysical bodies, but of complex institutional facts, for the recognitiona nd determination of which the following constitutive rule must be applied: 'Givenarawfact P,let us saythat P counts as Q in the context C.' Ac ommonlyu sede xample is money,that can be identified, let us say, with the rawfactassociated with the exclusively physical properties of the paper that bank notes are made of. Applying the constitutive rule proposed by Searle, we can state that although P is equivalent to the rawf acta ssociated with money, when the rawf act P occurs in the context C (equivalent,f or example, to the USAF ederal Reserve that issues the currency), it is counted as Q because,i n that case, it represents money as astoreofvalue. Therefore, asocial environment or context exists in which certain rawf acts maycount as institutional facts, i. e. facts that are ontologicallys ubjective.
Ontologicallys ubjective facts determine and exhibit ac ollective dimension both in intentionality and in cognition.I tc an likewise be said that as these are facts whose objectivity,value, consistency,adequacy,etc. can be contextualized and evaluated by human collectives, both institutional facts and the cognitive contextsorenvironments to which they are associated (and from which they emerge)haveasocial dimension, and can be addressed from an epistemic point of view.
Considering the latter,some authors arguethat social cognition in anarrow sense must be distinguished from its broad sense. Social cognition in an arrow sense is required to understand the attitudes and intentions of aperson in every specific context.I nabroad sense, however,s ocial cognition is that which takes place when we need to understand the intention shared by the members of social groups that in each case constituted etermined institutional contexts (Fiebich 2014) . These distinctions reinforce one of the fundamental theses in the contemporary development of cognitive science: that intelligent behavior depends on people'sc ognitive systems to manipulate, transform and produce information when they develop in the social environment.D espitea ll this evidence,i tc an be said thatall of us are immersed in social environments in which emblematic models of cooperative rationality are faced with institutional designs that not onlydonot favor, but also impede cooperation. Nevertheless, thereisenough political and social evidence to think that there mayb eaclear opportunityi nt he future for the emergenceo fc ooperative cognition.
Cooperative cognition
Political parties are ruled by the imperative for organization, but the formation of public opinion is no longer dependent exclusively on them. The diffuse energy issued by the electorate is not easilysubjected to the discipline of party-oriented proposals,orofmedia disputes that, despite their projection, maybeignored by manyp eople. Social networks have become an ew public space emancipated from traditional communication media and from the channels open between citizens and those in government.H owever,i ti su nclear in which sense social networks act as an alternative to the traditionals ystem of intermediation set up by trade unions and pressuregroups.Itisearlytooffer adiagnosis or assessment of the place that social networks will occupy in democratic practice. Nevertheless, despite the difficulties experienced todayinestablishing favorable forecasts,different authorsh avec oncluded thatt he communicative practices within social networks implyatype of presencethatisperhaps excessively chaotic, because it: -offers af ragmentedp ublic in disorganized public spheres; -favors dispersion and rivalry in ag reat number of chat-rooms; -fomentscentrifugal attitudes, through the absenceoffilters to screen reliable information; -works by reaction, and is liable to be reactionary as it encourages currents of praise/criticism; -produces 'clusters' that fail to conform to a 'we';a nd -hinders the cohesion and unification necessary for preferences and proposals to reach the political system.
